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ABSTRACT 
Since Yemen has a history of border disputes with Saudi Arabia, this addresses 
the question of Yemen’s role in the security of the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen suffers 
from a weak economy and a number of security issues of its own. Through the borders 
shared with its GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) neighbors, Yemen has become plagued 
by a nexus of terrorism, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking. Yet Yemen is unable to 
effectively combat these threats because of weak border control and poor cooperation 
with its regional neighbors, which points to the issues of border control and transnational 
cooperation within the GCC as an important area of research. The scope of the research 
will encompass and scrutinize the role of borders and how terrorism flourishes through 
the Peninsula. That way, we can observe what has been done to solve this security threat, 
and what could be done. The thesis will examine potential solutions to the problems 
created by border security and a lack of cooperation, and will argue that a viable solution 
can be found by Yemen joining the GCC in a united force. This would help insulate the 
Arabian Peninsula from the internal threats facing it. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




C. THE CONTROVERSY...................................................................................2 
1. Internal Threat Facing the Arabian Peninsula .................................3 
2. Previous Security Forces Protecting the Arabian Peninsula ...........4 
3. What Could Be Done ...........................................................................5 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................6 
II. HISTORY OF THE REGION....................................................................................7 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................7 
B. BORDER CONFLICTS ..................................................................................7 
1. History of Borders................................................................................7 
a. Wahhabi Explosion...................................................................8 
b. British Colonialism .................................................................10 
2. Major Disputes ...................................................................................10 
a.  Saudi Arabia - Yemen.............................................................11 
b.  Saudi Arabia - Oman ..............................................................14 
c.  Saudi Arabia - UAE ................................................................15 
d.  Bahrain - Qatar.......................................................................17 
3. Consequences of the Disputes ...........................................................18 
a. Political Bitterness ..................................................................19 
b.  Lack of Cooperation................................................................20 
c.  Instability and Openness to Terrorism...................................20 
III. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL: A STORY OF FAILURE..........................21 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................21 
B. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE PREVIOUSLY?..............................................22 
1. The GCC Forces Have Always Been Inept......................................22 
a.  Valid Weapons and Equipment Not Put to Use .....................22 
b. Lack of Personnel and Training ............................................23 
2. Heavy Reliance on Foreign Services to Defend GCC Interests .....24 
a.  Iraq, Former Protector of the Peninsula in the 1980s ..........24 
b.  The U.S., Current Protector since the 1990s .........................25 
C. WHY SHOULD THERE BE AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION .............28 
1. Billions of Dollars Worth of Equipment Should Be Utilized .........28 
2. GWOT.................................................................................................30 
IV. RISE OF REGIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST THREATS ....33 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................33 
B. AL-QAEDA ....................................................................................................34 
C. MAJOR INCIDENTS....................................................................................35 




4. UAE .....................................................................................................38 
5. Kuwait.................................................................................................39 
6. Qatar ...................................................................................................41 
7. Bahrain................................................................................................42 
D. SAUDI ARABIA, THE BIG PROBLEM ....................................................42 
E. YEMEN’S INTERNAL THREATS.............................................................43 
1.  Terrorism............................................................................................43 
2.  Political Unrest ...................................................................................45 
3.  Weak Economy...................................................................................46 
V. WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE, AND WHY?.....................................................47 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................47 
B. YEMEN TO JOIN THE GCC......................................................................47 
C. WHY?..............................................................................................................48 
1. Interest for the GCC Countries ........................................................48 
a.  Yemen Could Provide Soldiers ...............................................48 
b.  Border Conflicts Put to Rest ...................................................51 
c.  Joint Military Training and Cooperation ..............................52 
2. It Is in Yemen’s Interest to Maintain Security in the Arabian 
Peninsula.............................................................................................53 
a.  Millions of Yemeni Workers Working in GCC......................53 
b.  Economic Benefits ..................................................................55 
c.  United Forces to Counter Threats from Within and 
Abroad .....................................................................................56 
VI. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................73 
 
 ix
LIST OF MAPS 
Map 1.1. Border Disputes between Yemen and its Neighbors .......................................11 
Map 1.2. Course of Final Border Agreement between Yemen and Saudi Arabia ..........14 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1. Yemeni Terrorist Events ..................................................................................44 
Table 4.1. Military Manpower (2005 – 2006) ..................................................................50 
 xii





Security in the Middle East has always been regarded as intricate. There have not 
been any proper solutions to security issues in the region, especially terrorism issues. In 
the case of the Arabian Peninsula, terrorism is one of the major hindrances in the face of 
stability, security, and development. Despite the efforts of the Gulf monarchies, however, 
terrorism remains a constant threat. While the Gulf States take their internal threats 
seriously, most attempts to establish legitimate fighting forces have failed and proved to 
malfunction. The lack of genuine cooperation between the Peninsula states has made 
terrorism more feasible, as governments do not cooperate on common measures to 
combat terrorism. This lack of cooperation is mainly due to unresolved border disputes. 
Not only are the borders not secured enough to completely stop terrorists from 
mobilizing, but they are also not completely agreed upon.  
Since Yemen has a history of border disputes with Saudi Arabia, this addresses 
the question of Yemen’s role in this security issue. Yemen suffers from a weak economy 
and a number of security issues of its own. Through the borders shared with its GCC 
neighbors, Yemen has become plagued by a nexus of terrorism, arms smuggling, and 
drug trafficking. Yet Yemen is unable to effectively combat these threats because of 
weak border control and poor cooperation with its regional neighbors, which points to the 
issues of border control and transnational cooperation within the GCC as an important 
area of research. The scope of the research will encompass and scrutinize the role of 
borders and how terrorism flourishes through the Peninsula. That way, it can be observed 
what has been done to solve this security threat, and what could be done. The thesis will 
examine potential solutions to the problems created by border security and a lack of 
cooperation, and will argue that a viable solution can be found by Yemen joining the 
GCC in a united force. This would help insulate the Arabian Peninsula from the internal 




Stability in the Arabian Peninsula is a vital security interest not only for the area’s 
states, but for the U.S. government (USG) as well. As the Arabian Peninsula becomes 
more stable and safer, the USG will be able to pursue its interests of securing the region’s 
oil sources and controlling nuclear proliferation. Aside from these geo-strategic concerns, 
eliminating terrorism is an important goal in its own right, and provides a window into 
studying the phenomenon of joint security cooperation in the Arabian Peninsula.  
The future security of the Arabian Peninsula relies heavily on cooperation 
between the concerned states, and focuses on three main factors. The first factor is the 
resolving of the border disputes between the countries. With that being addressed, the 
ramifications will typically reflect better cooperation and more seriousness about 
securing the borders. Second, and as a result of more protected borders, terrorism will be 
more effectively countered with a higher success rate in quarantining and capturing 
terrorist networks. Third, this cooperation would not be possible with a country missing 
from the puzzle. This means that although Yemen is not technically a Gulf state, it shares 
all of the borders, and thus, has the same threats as those facing the other states. 
Therefore, by looking at Yemen within the context of the region as a whole, the idea of 
not adding it to the equation becomes impossible. 
C. THE CONTROVERSY 
To scrutinize the security of the Arabian Peninsula, the region has to be regarded 
as a whole; and not each state’s security individually. Since the region is unique in many 
of its characteristics, it is different from many countries around the world. For example, 
unlike many other nations, the GCC states and Yemen have not yet reached final border 
agreements. It is true that there are treaties that provide resolutions, but the truth is that 
they are not final, and this will be demonstrated later on in Chapter II. In that chapter, it 
will be shown how this disagreement over borders causes bitterness and lack of 
cooperation in many aspects; with the security aspect topping the list. With this lack of 
cooperation, it was not a surprise when the GCC Shield Forces were shut down after 
years of failure to cooperate and to achieve a significant security apparatus. This story of 
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failure, along with their reliance on foreign protectors, will be discussed in chapter three 
of this research. Finally, in order to maintain a balance and keep the research focused, the 
role of Yemen and the benefits of it joining the GCC in cooperation will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
To make it clear, the following literature review has been organized in the same 
order that research was conducted. Discussion will begin on the borders issue, and its 
ominous effect of inadvertently sheltering terrorism; it will then be followed with an 
examination of what has been done to effectively solve this security threat. Then, 
literature will be presented that gives convincing evidence that Yemen is indeed needed, 
not only as part of this equation to solve the security threat, but as a partner in the Global 
War on Terror with a focus on the region. 
1. Internal Threat Facing the Arabian Peninsula 
It is very important to define the security threat facing the Arabian Peninsula. 
After reading extensive literature on this topic, it is the author’s opinion that the real 
security threat stems from the border disputes. Writing specifically about Yemen, for 
example, Michael Knights asserts that the “contiguous borders with Yemen and Iraq-both 
key theaters of operation for transnational jihadists- make the country a critical 
transshipment point for weaponry and jihadists engaged in a multidirectional flow of 
personnel and equipment throughout the GCC.”1 The way to limit the contribution of 
contiguous borders to terrorism, Knights argues, is by enhancing border security. “The 
threat posed by terrorists from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen can be further reduced by 
getting serious about border security.”2  
Many authors emphasize the importance of the border security issue, especially 
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Joseph Kechichian argues, for example, that “with the 
exception, perhaps, of the Saudi-Yemen boundary question should be seen in a regional 
                                                 
1 Michael Knights, Troubled Waters: Future U.S. Security Assistance in the Persian Gulf (Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), 35.  
2 Ibid., 42. 
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context in which states are striding actively to finalize the political map.”3 However, until 
this day, this issue has not been studied enough by scholars, like Askar Al-enazy said 
“The current literature on the subject contains no published academic work dealing 
directly with the legal aspects of the Saudi-Yemeni border conflict.”4  
Not only are the internal borders a problem in the security of the Peninsula, but 
the external borders too. For example, through the eastern part of the Peninsula, it is 
believed that there are forces that are connected with the Mujahedeen movements in 
Afghanistan. “They are concentrated in the eastern shores of the Gulf and Yemen. They 
fight for the establishment of ‘true’ Muslim states in the region, and are against foreign 
military presence.”5 Of course, there are other terrorist networks roaming the Peninsula, 
with Al-Qaeda on top of that list. Therefore, it is safe to infer that terrorism evolves on a 
higher scale in the Peninsula due to weak border security. 
2. Previous Security Forces Protecting the Arabian Peninsula 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was created on May 25, 1981. Security was 
one of the main reasons that brought about the GCC. The Iran-Iraq war posed a threat 
which the individual states in the Arab Gulf knew they could not handle on their own. As 
such, they grouped together to form a mutual defense plan. The GCC members all set out 
to strengthen their military capabilities by ordering top of the line weapons and 
equipment6. However, the forces were more symbolic in a way, after proving to be 
useless during the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Even though the military equipment 
provided exceeded billions in U.S. dollars, “… the Peninsular Shield Forces, a GCC 
reaction force of roughly brigade size, was not utilized or alerted during the entire 
crisis.”7  
                                                 
3 Joseph A. Kechichian, Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 213. 
4 Askar Al-enazy, The Long Road from Taif to Jeddah: Resolution of Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Dispute 
(Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, 2006), 2. 
5 Majid Tehranian, Bridging a Gulf: Peace-Building in West Asia (I.B. Tauris, 2003), 35. 
6 Lt. Col. Fred L. Hart, Jr., “A Veteran’s Story.” Military.Com Database,  




After a series of minor military exercises and no significance for a period of four 
years, the GCC Shield Forces8 shut down in the beginning of 2006. This caused a major 
loss in confidence for the GCC countries, which is very essential to a stable region. As 
Joseph Kechichian put it, “Naturally, the more GCC countries have confidence in 
themselves, the more they can contribute to regional stability.”9 As a result, the Gulf 
monarchies have always relied on foreign powers to protect their interests, and so they 
have become dependent on foreign forces to fight on their behalf. 
3. What Could Be Done 
Yemen has always been seen as a potential solution to this security threat, either 
as the only solution or a major player in a solution. In the aftermath of the 1991 War for 
Kuwait, leading commentators have argued that a more prominent role by Arab states 
such as Yemen10 is important. Furthermore, “Yemen is expected to join the GCC and its 
participation is vital to a viable security regime in the region,”11 and “Yemen must 
necessarily be included.”12   
Other solutions suggested including other countries in the agreement, thus Yemen 
could be included as well. To close down illicit cross-border trafficking, the GCC needs 
partnerships with Iraq and Yemen, as well as Iran.13 To attain any semblance of 
prosperity and peace, all three neighbors-Iran, Iraq, and Yemen-should be greeted and 
entrusted with a role in regional affairs.14 Surprisingly, and given a history of border and 




                                                 
8 The forces of the GCC combined to form a united military to protect their interests. 
9 Kechichian, Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States, 403. 
10 Ibid., 409. 
11 Tehranian, Bridging a Gulf: Peace-Building in West Asia, 11. 
12 Ibid., 88. 
13 Knights, Troubled Waters: Future U.S. Security Assistance in the Persian Gulf, 192. 
14 Ibid., 405. 
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those propositions. “Saudi Arabian foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal expressed 
support for an inclusive Gulf-wide security arrangement (involving the GCC, Iran, Iraq, 
and Yemen).”15 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This research will be primarily conducted by the policy analysis method. Since 
the current policies in the region on Yemen and the Gulf Cooperation Council with 
regards to border and terrorism will be reviewed, it is more suitable to examine this 
research from that perspective. The chapter on the GCC forces will be a case study, in 
which the assets will be scrutinized, as well as what led to their failure. Therefore, it will 
be feasible at the end of the search to address a few policy recommendations to solve the 
security threat of the Arabian Peninsula. 
The area of study that will be focused on is considered lacking. There are many 
media reports and news articles, yet the essence of scholarly text is missing. Therefore, 
part of the task will be to find information in a thorough search. For example, for the 
primary sources, quotations will be needed from the current policy makers in Yemen and 
the GCC. Therefore, by documenting recent interviews with high profile decision makers, 
the research will be up to date and more rigorous than it would be if used as a primary 
source or basis for research by other researchers. Other primary sources will be cited 
from a few books and organizations like the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
and Jane’s Publications. The secondary sources will be the news and reported media 
documents from news sources both in Yemen and the Gulf region.  
                                                 
15 Knights, Troubled Waters: Future U.S. Security Assistance in the Persian Gulf, 194. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE REGION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Arabian Peninsula was inhabited by nomads whose view of territory was 
defined by authority, allegiance and leadership. This view began to change with the 
advent of the first oil concession in 1930. The inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula were 
then left to quarrel over the border lines. In the early 1970s, four main border disputes 
involving members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states occurred with each 
other, or with Yemen. Of these four disputes, one has recently been rekindled. Saudi 
Arabia maintained border disputes with Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. 
The fourth border dispute was between Bahrain and Qatar. 
B. BORDER CONFLICTS 
1. History of Borders 
Nomads were the main inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula. As was their way of 
life, nomads spent their life traveling from one location to the next based on the season 
and water supply. This type of movement might lead one to wrongly assume that 
nomadic tribes do not have a real notion of territory. The nomadic concept of territory is 
not one defined by lines drawn on a map. Instead, territory is defined by human authority, 
allegiance and leadership. They view territorial ownership as durational that often 
changes with the seasons.  
Up until the early twentieth century, no exact territorial boundaries were defined 
in the Arabian Peninsula. This form of traditional boundaries made it extremely difficult 
to define legal boundaries. As Ian Brownie, a leading legal authority on international 
boundaries, pointed out, there is a “relative insignificance of traditional boundaries in the 
world today.”16 There were many factors that prompted the creation of borders; two of 
which are: the discovery of oil and control over oil production as well as the colonial 
influence. 
                                                 
16 Richard Schofield, “Negotiating the Saudi-Yemeni International Boundary,” The British-Yemeni 
Society, July 2000. http://www.al-bab.com/bys/articles/schofield00.htm [Accessed March 2007]. 
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With the signing of the first oil concession in the 1930s, border delimitation 
began. It was the British who had maintained and monitored national boundaries, though 
borders were never properly demarcated. Thus, when oil was sought after and found, 
many border conflicts began. With the withdrawal of British officials in the early 1970s, 
territorial claims came out in the open.17 
a. Wahhabi Explosion 
Saudi Arabian border lines were influenced by the Wahhabi movement. 
The origins of the Wahhabi movement dates back to mid-eighteenth century Najd, to a 
man named Mohammed ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhab. As a religious scholar in the Arabian oasis 
town of ‘Uyaynah, Abd Al-Wahhab came to the conclusion that most Muslims,’ 
including his own teachers,’ belief in the doctrine of tawhid (absolute monotheism, a 
doctrine of the unity and uniqueness of God) was distorted. He preached that Muslims 
should return to the true teachings of God by following the words of the Quran and the 
preaching of the Muslim prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). He preached 
“revolutionary ideas of religious reformation on fundamentalist lines.”18 Any Muslim 
who did not follow his strict interpretation of Islam was labeled as a murtadd (apostate) 
or mushrik (polytheist). Abd Al-Wahhab found many practices of his time blasphemous: 
such practices as praying to the dead, making pilgrimages to mosques and tombs, using 
votives and making sacrifices to any one other than God, and the lack of proper attention 
to obligatory prayers. He denounced anyone, Muslim or not, who did any of the 
aforementioned things. Only those who followed his strict teaching were considered to be 
true Muslims.  
The Islamic scholars of the Ottoman Empire (the Islamic state at that time) 
rejected Abd Al-Wahhab’s views. In 1744, Abd al-Wahhab sought refuge at Al-Dir’iyah. 
Al-Dir’iyah was ruled by Muhammad bin Saud Al Saud. Abd Al-Wahhab’s critique of 
                                                 
17 Helem Chapin Metz, ed., Persian Gulf States: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for the Library 
of Congress, 1993. http://countrystudies.us/Persian-gulf-states/94.htm [Accessed March 2007]. 
18 Britannica Online, “Arabia: THE COUNTRIES OF ARABIA: Saudi Arabia: HISTORY: The 
Wahhabi movement,” 1997. http://www.naqshbandi.org/ottomans/wahhabi/origins.htm [Accessed March 
2007]. 
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the Ottoman Khalifa was welcomed by the rebellious Al Saud. A relationship was formed 
by the two men with Al Saud at the political front and Al-Wahhab at the spiritual front. 
And thus began the Wahhabi movement.  
After the death of Mohammed bin Saud, his son, Abdul Aziz Bin 
Muhammad became the ruler of Al-Dir’iyah. Based on the Wahhabi teachings, Al Saud 
declared himself leader of the Muslims and began the practice of inherited authority 
(Wilayat ul-A’hal) with his son Saud as his successor. This challenged the Ottoman 
Khalifa in Istanbul. Also, with the support of the Wahhabi teachings, all Muslims had to 
present their bayah (oath of allegiance) to the Muslim ruler, who in turn must guide his 
people according to the laws of God.19 
Al Saud then sought to capture all of Arabia by spreading the Wahhabi 
school of thought. By the start of the nineteenth century, the Al Sauds attacked Karbala 
and destroyed the Shi’ite shrine of the tomb of Caliph al-Husayn. In 1803, the Al Sauds 
captured Mecca and Medina. The implications of taking control of the Muslim land of 
pilgrimage were strong enough to get the attention of the Ottoman Khalifa. The Ottoman 
army, led by the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt, recaptured all of al Hijaz from the Al Sauds 
and freed it from Wahhabi political authority.20 
The Al Sauds then settled into Riyadh, but internal turmoil weakened 
them. By the late nineteenth century, the rival family of Al Rashid drove the Al Sauds out 
of Riyadh and into exile in Kuwait. In 1902, Abd Al Aziz Bin Abd Ul Rahman Al Saud 
fought the Al Rahids and regained control of Riyadh. There he established himself as the 
Wahhabi Imam. Imam Abd Al Aziz utilized the military help of the “radical Ikhwan 
forces … [who were] desert warriors … dedicated to promoting Wahhabi Islam”21 to 
conquer al Hijaz by 1924.  
                                                 
19 “Library of Congress Search Result: Saudi Arabia: Wahhabi Theology,” December 1992. 
http://servercc.oakton.edu/~pboisver/WTC/LibCongWahhabi.htm [Accessed March 2007]. 
20 J. E. Peterson. Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia. 2nd ed., Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003, 
xxi. http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Saudi_Arabia_Chronology.pdf [Accessed 
March 2007]. 
21 Country Profile: Saudi Arabia. Library of Congress – Federal Research Division. September 2006. 
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia became an official state in 1932, a kingdom 
built on the basis of a Wahhabi state.22 The affluences gained from the discovery of oil 
made it all the easier to spread Wahhabi thought throughout the world. Wahhabi schools 
were built internationally and more publications could be made and circulated. 
b. British Colonialism 
Britain’s main interest for control in the Gulf was to maintain a secure 
passageway for the shipping to and from India of its possessions. The East-West trade 
had been controlled by the Muslims during the Middle Ages. The Portuguese then 
designed superior ships that were able to withstand long voyages. As a result, they were 
able to transport goods around Africa and no longer needed to use the Red Sea route. The 
Portuguese were then able to extend their control of the Arabian Sea to include Oman and 
Iran. Local rulers were allowed control of their land, but they first had to pay a tribute to 
the Portuguese.  
In the seventeenth century, the Safavid shah of Iran, Abbas I, challenged 
the Portuguese control of the shaykh of Hormuz. The shaykh had switched from paying 
tribute to the shah to paying it to the Portuguese. Because the shah at the time was too 
weak to deal with this issue on his own, he enlisted the help of two European nations, the 
British and the Dutch. Both nations came to the shah’s aid and were able to drive the 
Portuguese out. Soon however, they both found themselves fighting each other for 
control of the Iranian market. Britain won. Thus, by the nineteenth century, the British 
had become the major force in the gulf.23 
2. Major Disputes 
Despite treaties, borders are still disputed, particularly between Saudi Arabia and 
its neighbors. Saudi Arabia is the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula, covering over 
                                                 
22 Country Profile: Saudi Arabia. 
23 Helem Chapin Metz, ed. Persian Gulf States: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of 
Congress, 1993. http://countrystudies.us/persian-gulf-states/11.htm [Accessed March 2007]. 
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eighty percent of the region.24 It shares borders with seven countries. With Saudi Arabia 
and some of the other countries in the region being a little over a century old, some of the 
border boundaries have yet to be finalized. In order to achieve and maintain regional 
stability, territorial disputes in the area must be reconciled. The border conflicts to be 
discussed are those between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Oman, and Bahrain and Qatar. 
a.  Saudi Arabia - Yemen 
 
Map 1.1. Border Disputes between Yemen and its Neighbors25 
 
The border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen dates back to the 
war between the two Arab nations in 1934. To end the war, both nations signed the 
Treaty of Taif that same year. The treaty provided for a delimitation of their common  
 
                                                 
24 Helem Chapin Metz, ed. Saudi Arabia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of 
Congress, 1992. http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabia/14.htm [Accessed March 2007]. 
25 Schofield, “Negotiating the Saudi-Yemeni International Boundary.” 
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border. Asir, Jizan and Najran, ethnically Yemeni provinces, were ceded to Saudi Arabia. 
Much of the eastern border, however, was not properly marked for boundary limits. The 
maritime border in the Red Sea was also left undefined by this treaty. 
With the booming oil industry, Saudi Arabia needed to plan for a strategic 
southward passageway to the Arabian Sea which would then lead to the Indian Ocean. 
Saudi oil was exported by tankers going through one of three waterways (the Suez Canal 
and Bab Al-Mandab in the Red Sea and the Straits of Hormuz in the Gulf).26 None of 
these waterways belonged to the Saudis. It is safe to assume that Saudi Arabia would aim 
to win the border disputes to the south to provide added security for its oil exports. 
One article of the Treaty of Taif states that the border arrangements, as 
described in the treaty, are to be renewed every twenty years. This treaty has since been 
renewed numerous times. Another article of the treaty prohibited the building of a wall or 
fence along the border. Claiming a rise in smuggling, Saudi Arabia embarked on a fence 
building project in 2003 along its border with Yemen. Enforcement of border control and 
restrictions was becoming more and more difficult with an open border with Yemen. In 
December 2001, the Saudi government’s attempts to capture one of Osama Bin Laden’s 
body guards, Abu Ali Al-Harithi, failed because of his moving around between the 
borders. Between March 2002 and February 2003, many border guards, Yemeni and 
Saudi, were killed in the frontier town of Jizan.27 However, article 5 of the Treaty of Taif 
states that no wall or ‘fortified building’ shall be built along the frontier line. Yemen 
openly objected and refused the building of the wall project. Eventually, Saudi Arabia 
stopped its work on the wall between the borders. 
After the unifying of Yemen in May of 1990, Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
needed to get together and agree on common boundaries and territorial limits. The 
unification of the two Yemens resulted in the presence of the first democratic country in 
the Arabian Peninsula. It was no secret that a successful democratic nation posed a 
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significant threat to its neighboring monarchies, especially to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia 
made many attempts to undermine the stability of Yemen’s unity. Saudi Arabia had 
always meddled in the affairs of Yemen, even before the unification. It did so to provide 
just enough instability in the two Yemens so as to ensure its own stability. Saudi Arabia 
provided financial support to the secessionists and weapons across the border during the 
Yemeni civil war. It wanted to undermine the democracy and unity of Yemen. Yemeni 
unity prevailed and the civil war ended in 1994. 
The new constitution of the united Yemen contained a line stating the 
“Republic of Yemen is an independent sovereign state, an inviolable unit, no part of 
which may be relinquished.”28 This led many to speculate that Yemen was now willing 
and ready to recover the ‘lost provinces’ it had ceded over to Saudi Arabia in the Treaty 
of Taif in 1934. 
In early 1995, both sides signed a memorandum of Understanding. By 
signing the memorandum, they agreed to take part in serious negotiations to settle their 
border disputes based on the Treaty of Taif.29 Both sides met frequently in the following 
years to discuss the border disputes. Saudi Arabia wanted to keep these negotiations 
solely about the border, whereas Yemen wanted to include economic agreements as well. 
Three years later, they finally came to an agreement and the new border treaty was 
signed. No economic incentives were added. The new agreements made the Taif line to 
the west permanent. The treaty also “spell[ed] out the general coordinates of the entire 
1,500 kilometer border.”30 
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Map 1.2. Course of Final Border Agreement between Yemen and Saudi Arabia31 
 
b.  Saudi Arabia - Oman 
Qabus ibn Said became ruler of Oman in 1970 after Oman’s coup d’état. 
Qabus’s rule sought to be proactive for its nations and the region. Qabus aimed to reverse 
Sultan Ibn Taimur’s rule of isolation and hoped to make Oman an international force to 
be reckoned with. It should also be noted that Oman’s geostrategic position of having a 
long coastline, as well as an entry point at the Strait of Hormuz, drew the attention of 
many foreign powers. With the interest of the foreign powers (mainly Britain and the 
United States) in the country, Oman’s foreign policy has been nonconfrontational and it 
sought to keep good regional relations with its gulf neighbors.32 Oman resolved its border 
disputes with the United Arab Emirates and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
in 1981 and 1982, respectively. Its border dispute with Saudi Arabia would only get fully 
resolved in 1991.  
The Oman and Saudi Arabia border dispute dealt with the Al Buraymi 
Oasis. Rulers of Muscat, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and the Al Sauds all claimed this oasis 
settlement since the nineteenth century.33 By the early 1900s, three of the nine villages of 
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Al Buraymi Oasis were claimed by Oman and the remaining six villages were claimed by 
Abu Dhabi. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia had, on many occasions, occupied parts of the 
villages and thus, with the oil potential of the oasis, pressed their claim on the territory. 
The British established themselves in the village of Buraymi in 1952 to support the Abu 
Dhabi and Muscat claims on the oasis.  
In retaliation, Saudi Arabia sent some of its troops to occupy the village of 
Khamsa to assert their control of the oasis. To avoid further military conflict, a standstill 
agreement was signed that same year and an international tribunal was created in 1954.34 
The efforts of the international tribunal failed in 1955. The British, with the aid of the 
Sultan’s army and the Trucial Oman Scouts, expelled the Saudi presence from the Al 
Buraymi Oasis. After its coup d’état in 1970, Oman sought to normalize its relations with 
Saudi Arabia, resulting in relations being formally established between the two nations 
by December 1970. In 1974, an agreement was reached between Oman, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, settling the Al Buraymi Oasis conflict. Oman would receive 
three of the villages and Abu Dhabi would receive the remaining six villages in the oasis. 
A territorial corridor south and east of Qatar leading to the Persian Gulf was ceded by the 
United Arab Emirates to Saudi Arabia as part of the agreement. Control of the oil field at 
Shayba, which had yet to be exploited, was given to Saudi Arabia.35 The border 
delimitation between Oman and Saudi Arabia was finalized and legalized in March of 
1990. 
c.  Saudi Arabia - UAE 
As mentioned earlier in the Saudi Arabia and Oman border conflict, Saudi 
Arabia’s and the United Arab Emirates’ main border dispute was over the Al Buraymi 
Oasis. Though both countries reached a border agreement in 1974, they are still in 
disagreement. The 1974 agreement was never ratified by the United Arab Emirates 
government. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates dates back 
to nearly two centuries ago, between the tribes of Al Nahyan (now the ruler of Abu 
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Dhabi) and the Al Saud. The more powerful Al Sauds dominated the impoverished Al 
Nahyan tribe. The Al Nahyan accepted their dominance but they strongly resisted Al 
Saud’s strict version of Islam, Wahhabism. Their main point of disagreement was over 
the Al Buraymi Oasis, “a fertile jewel in an otherwise barren desert.”36  
Saudi Arabia seized the land forcibly, but the United Arab Emirates, along 
with Oman and the British, reclaimed the land. To settle their disputes, the three nations 
signed a border agreement in 1974. At that same time, the United Arab Emirates was 
seeking international recognition. Saudi Arabia agreed to recognize the nascent state for a 
small strip of land that would act as a territorial corridor along the Qatar border leading to 
the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia also got control of a small strip of land between it and the 
United Arab Emirates, the Shaybah oil fields. The Shaybah oil fields are now producing 
over 550,000 barrels per day, thus producing revenues that exceed $10 billion annually.37 
With the use of new technology, such as horizontal drilling, the Shaybah oil fields have 
the potential of yielding up to 18 billion barrels in just a few years.38 
Frustrated at the apparent loss of the Shaybah oil fields, United Arab 
Emirates officials are now declaring that parts of the 1974 agreement have become 
‘inapplicable.’ Recently, the objection was made public with the publication of the 2006 
edition of the official United Arab Emirates Yearbook. The Yearbook contains a map of 
the United Arab Emirates that seems to have nullified what had been agreed upon in 
1974. The map shows that the UAE territory extends over to Qatar (containing land that 
had been ceded to Saudi Arabia in 1974) and extends to the south to include most of the 
oil field in Shaybah.39 
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This new drawing of the map had not been published in previous versions 
of the Yearbook. There was no official apology or claim of error from United Arab 
Emirates officials, nor is there expected to be one.  
This change of heart on territorial boundaries may be attributed to the 
current ruler of the state. The 1974 agreement was agreed to from the United Arab 
Emirates’ side by Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan. At that time, Sheikh Zayed was seeking to 
gain independence and international recognition, so giving up a small piece of land for 
Saudi Arabia’s recognition seemed fair. Sheikh Zayed passed away in 2004 and his son, 
the new ruler of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan no 
longer saw the fairness of that agreement. Sheikh Khalifa, on his first official visit to 
Saudi Arabia in December of 2006 as ruler of the United Arab Emirates, reportedly 
informed the Saudis of the border issue. The Saudi reply was that the border issue had 
been settled in 1974. 
d.  Bahrain - Qatar 
Another border conflict in the Middle East stems from the land dispute 
between the Al Khalifa of Bahrain and the Al Thani of Qatar. The dispute is over Az 
Zubarah, (which is on the northwest coast of Qatar), the Hawar islands (that stand forty 
kilometers south of Az Zubarah) and various reefs in the Gulf. The Al Khalifa family had 
settled at Az Zubarah during the eighteenth century before driving out the Iranians from 
Bahrain. The Al Thani of Qatar strongly claimed Az Zubarah, which is on the Qatari 
mainland. They also laid claim to the Hawar islands as they were a stone’s throw from 
Qatar and over twenty kilometers from Bahrain.  
The dispute reached a high point in 1986 between Qatar and Bahrain. The 
Bahraini government had begun the construction of a coast guard station on one of the 
reefs off Qatar’s coast, Fasht al Dibal.40 Qatar retaliated by deploying some of its troops 
to remove and essentially ‘kidnap’ the workers. Through regional mediation, specifically 
by Saudi Arabia, both sides eventually came to a truce and Bahrain agreed to end its 
construction. Both sides also agreed to sink the Fasht al Dibal territory low enough into 
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the sea so as to impede any future construction plans. Though the sinking of Fasht al 
Dibal may have helped solve their 1986 dispute, it would be impractical to sink the 
remaining disputed islands and reefs just to avoid conflict. Bahrain, for years, insisted on 
regional mediation, though Qatar refused, as it had ‘fractious’ relations with Saudi 
Arabia. Qatar was insisting on international arbitration and wanted to take their case to 
the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In 1991, Qatar took its case to The 
Hague. Bahrain eventually did agree to abide by the World Court’s decision. On March 
16 of 2001, the World Court issued its ruling on the border dispute between Qatar and 
Bahrain. The ruling asserted Qatar’s claim to Az Zubarah; the Hawar islands belonged to 
Bahrain. The court also defined the maritime boundary between Qatar and Bahrain. 
3. Consequences of the Disputes 
During the 1990s, all of Arabia saw a movement towards the delimitation of 
boundaries. The political map of Arabia was progressively being finalized. Richard 
Schofield, Director of Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Center at 
SOAS, London, attributes the motivation for this movement to many reasons, the main of 
which is materialistic and pragmatic.41 Many of the Arabian states have exhausted some 
of their older oil fields and are thus looking for newer, fresher fields. Many exploratory 
drives for oil have been conducted on most of their own land. The territory surrounding 
disputed boundaries has, “because of their politically sensitive location and general 
remoteness,”42 been relatively untouched by the oil industry. The implication that these 
lands would provide for more economic power was at a high and so many nations wanted 
to legitimize their presence in those areas. They wanted the legal authority to begin 
exploration, without any border incidents hindering their efforts. “The need to 
consolidate authority right up to the territorial limits of the state … may help to explain 
the progress made in finalizing border delimitation in recent years.”43  
                                                 




Another reason Arabia is witnessing a move towards the finalization of the 
delimitation of boundaries is to institutionalize and legalize the boundaries, so as to 
adhere to and be accountable to international law. Boundary agreements, since the early 
1990s, have increasingly been registered in the “appropriate international institutions.”44 
This implies to each nation and its neighbors that their territorial framework is at the 
‘point of no return.’ The Gulf War was a major factor in this area. The Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) became increasingly occupied “with the entrenchment, 
institutionalization, where appropriate, the finalization of the Arabian territorial 
framework.”45 A main outcome of the GCC summit of 1992 in Abu Dhabi was the 
inadmissibility of land that is acquired by force. The border disputes between the 
countries did not end without adding damage. The disputes left their mark in the form 
political bitterness, lack of cooperation, and instability and openness to terrorism. 
a. Political Bitterness 
Border sensitivities in the Middle East are never resolved 100 percent, 
though agreement after agreement is signed. This was the case with the border dispute 
between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They both signed an agreement in 
1974 to solve their border disputes. That agreement was then declared not ‘applicable’ 
just months after Sheikh Khalifa became the new ruler of the United Arab Emirates. With 
his new rule came a new political vision that included a United Arab Emirates with the 
land that had been ceded to Saudi Arabia as part of the 1974 agreement signed by the 
then ruler of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Zayed. Such actions substantiate the claim 
that rulers use border disputes to gain some competitive advantage. 
Besides wanting to keep the land granted to it by the 1974 agreement, 
Saudi Arabia also has an interest in isolating Qatar. Qatar was not involved in the 1974 
agreement, though it should have been as its border neighbor was changed (from the 
United Arab Emirates to Saudi Arabia). The Saudis are frustrated by the diplomatic 
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independence of Qatar.46 To enforce its political view, Saudi Arabia is disallowing the 
building of an undersea gas link from Qatar to Kuwait, claiming it runs through Saudi 
waters.47 
b.  Lack of Cooperation 
Currently, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are at odds over the 
building of an undersea pipeline from Qatar to the United Arab Emirates. The natural gas 
pipeline is costing the United Arab Emirates over $3.5 billion and promises to add to the 
growth of the United Arab Emirates economy.48 Saudi Arabia has objected to the 
pipeline and has demanded that work on it be stopped, claiming it crosses Saudi territory. 
A memo on July 8 of 2006 faxed by the Saudi government to the financiers of the 
pipeline project stated that the pipeline “cannot be constructed without the agreement of 
the kingdom.”49 If both parties agree to arbitration, their dispute is likely to end up in the 
International Court of Justice. 
c.  Instability and Openness to Terrorism 
Terrorism has turned these unclaimed stretches of empty and open desert 
into possible weaknesses.50 Though the borders might be defined on written agreements, 
there is a major lack of personnel to man the open terrain. Terrorists take advantage of 
such weaknesses to easily move around in the Gulf. 
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III. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL: A STORY OF FAILURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) formed in 1981 after the Iran-Iraq War to 
ensure security in the region. Yet its drastic failure in providing this security was 
apparent in its inability to prevent the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was not even 
capable of providing sufficient aid in the United States War in Iraq in 2003. Its ineptitude 
in providing regional security for its members has not improved. The addition of Yemen 
into the GCC would allow the GCC to accomplish better security in the region. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was created on May 25, 1981. The GCC 
includes the following six Arab Gulf States: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of 
Kuwait, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates. The GCC included the Arab States that overlooked the Gulf; as 
such, Yemen was not a member. The six GCC states held that a threat imposed on any 
one of them posed a threat to all of them. The states were joined by religion, as well as 
their faith in a common destiny and regional stability and security. The GCC Charter, 
which acts as the “constitution” of the GCC, dictates common laws in areas such as trade, 
economy, and tourism. Security is also a prime issue to the GCC. Security was one of the 
main reasons that brought about the GCC. The Iran-Iraq war posed a threat which the 
individual states in the Arab Gulf knew they could not handle on their own. As such, they 
grouped together to form a mutual defense plan.  
The aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war marked a new era for the Gulf States. The 
GCC members all set out to strengthen their military capabilities by ordering top of the 
line weapons and equipment.51 Yet the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait proved the 
worthlessness of the GCC forces as a defense pact, as well as the vulnerability and 
weakness of the GCC. The GCC, with all its new equipment and talks of a unified 
defense, did nothing to dissuade Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait.52 Lieutenant 
                                                 
51 Hart, Jr. “A Veteran’s Story.” 
52 Ibid. 
 22
Colonel Hart notes that “[d]uring the weeks preceding the invasion, the GCC did not 
even meet in session. Even the Peninsular Shield Forces, a GCC reaction force of roughly 
brigade size, was not utilized or alerted during the entire crisis.”53  
B. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE PREVIOUSLY? 
1. The GCC Forces Have Always Been Inept 
a.  Valid Weapons and Equipment Not Put to Use 
One lesson the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait taught the Gulf States was that 
they should buy massive equipment and weapons. In the late 1990s, the “massive arms-
buying spree” was put to a halt due to a lack of funding as a result of the low oil prices.54 
Ed Blanche notes that “Arab League statistics show that between 1995 and 2002, the 
GCC states spent $277 billion on defense and security - around 12.7 per cent of their 
combined gross domestic product.”55 Many of the GCC States spend a large proportion 
of their gross domestic products (GDP) on the military; for example “Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Oman spend up to 10 percent of their gross domestic products on the 
military, amounting to nearly $21 billion, $4 billion and $2.7 billion, respectively…it is 
estimated that countries like the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia 
would spend up to $60 billion this year.”56 
In Saudi Arabia, the Royal Saudi Air Forces (RSAF) is given a great deal 
of priority. The RSAF is the largest in the GCC. Although in the region it comes second 
to Israel’s Air Force, “it has little experience with offensive operations and its 
warfighting capabilities remain largely theoretical. This is due in part to its over-reliance  
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on foreign technical support and personnel to manage and maintain combat operations.”57 
The RSAF has acquired five E-3A airborne early-warning and control systems 
(AWACS).  
The GCC must move towards greater co-operation, says the analyst. They 
can't just keep throwing money at the problem and buying more platforms. 
They need a combined defence system in all aspects. They've all got to be 
on the same wavelength. This is where the smart money should be going - 
joint projects that allow them to deploy rapidly, with a common logistics 
network so that aircraft from one country can land on any airfield in the 
region. They need a network-enabling capability. Without this kind of co-
ordination and interoperability all these platforms are just dead meat.58  
b. Lack of Personnel and Training 
Members of the GCC are rentier states, ones where “their social contract 
rests upon provision of benefits to citizens, not extraction of resources (taxes and service) 
from them.”59 As such, requiring an obligatory military recruitment service would oppose 
the contract between state and society. Of the six states in the GCC, Kuwait is the only 
one with an obligatory military recruitment service. Yet before the 1990 Gulf War, 
Kuwaiti citizens could have avoided the service. 
Most of the GCC states also recruit only male citizens, thereby leaving out 
the other half of the population. The military career is not one that is given much thought 
to by citizens of the GCC states. There are not many incentives to join the military 
service, as there are better job opportunities in the civilian sector. All military services of 
the GCC lack prestige, save for the Omani military service. The Sultan of Oman’s direct 
involvement with the forces gives it that prestige.  
The lack of manpower in the GCC is one that has been greatly 
acknowledged, yet poorly reinforced. Saudi Arabia, which represents a large portion of 
the GCC in its size, announced after the Gulf War of its plans to double its military 
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personnel to 200,000 by the year 2000. Yet by the year 2005, it had only 150,000 people 
dispersed around its borders. The priority of acquiring arms precedes that of military 
recruitment. Saudi Arabia has in its possession “315 General Dynamics Land Systems 
M1A2s, 450 US M60A3s and 290 older French AMX-30Ds, many of which are non-
operational because of a personnel shortage.”60 “A $60 million programme to upgrade 
the [Saudi owned] E-3As’ capabilities was launched in 2001, although the Saudi crews 
are still unable to handle the complexities of large-scale combat operations.”61 
Many Gulf States do not lack manpower, as they have large populations. 
However, a large percentage of nearly each state’s population is made up of foreigners or 
expatriates. Nearly 50 percent of both United Arab Emirates’ and Saudi Arabia’s total 
population are foreign workers. The rest of the GCC states have a slightly lower 
percentage.62 In the United Arab Emirates, 40 percent of the army is made up of 
foreigners. Oman, the GCC state that has a prestigious army, is the only GCC state that 
has tighter restrictions for its recruitments. Thus, its army is made up of mainly Omani 
citizens.63  
The lack of manpower in the GCC was greatly noticed during the Gulf 
War. The Kuwaiti army was made up of biduns. These were people who were not of 
Kuwaiti origin.  
2. Heavy Reliance on Foreign Services to Defend GCC Interests 
a.  Iraq, Former Protector of the Peninsula in the 1980s 
Though Iran officially relinquished its claim to the state of Bahrain in 
1980, Bahrain officials, nevertheless, fear Iran’s alleged attempts to cause rebellion by 
using their impoverished Shi’ite population (estimated to be at 30 percent of Bahrain’s 
total population). Iran’s ambition in the region placed the Gulf States in an uncomfortable 
position.  
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The “centripetal dynamic” for the formation of the GCC was to form a 
united front against a common threat – the threat was Iran. The GCC was formed as a 
reaction to the Iraq – Iran War of 1980. Both Iraq and Iran were much larger than nearly 
all of the Gulf States and so their aim was to construct a unified security front. The arrest 
of a group of men in Bahrain in December of 1981 alarmed many of the Gulf States. The 
captured men belonged to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, a Tehran based 
revolutionary group that was alleged to have been funded by the Iranian embassy in 
Manama. They were planning to overthrow the regime there. This prompted the GCC 
members to openly support Iraq in its war against Iran. 
b.  The U.S., Current Protector since the 1990s 
The United States War in Iraq in 2003 was mainly executed without the 
aid of the GCC states. Although the GCC states sent 10,000 soldiers and two warships to 
help defend Kuwait, these forces were not involved in the assault on Iraq.64 The United 
States War on Iraq was seen as a removal of a threat to the GCC. The GCC was expected 
to plan a more effective defense strategy for the Gulf. Yet the GCC still relies on the 
United States for strategic defense.65 
Since the GCC states continue to buy modern weaponry, they invite 
foreign aid in the form of “continued reliance on foreign officers and foreign 
maintenance and training staffs at a time when all Gulf States are trying to achieve 
greater self-sufficiency.” 
As part of the GCC’s effort for military cooperation between the six Gulf 
States, the Peninsula Shield (Dir’ Al-Jazeera) was dismantled. The reasons for this have 
been attributed to the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in recent years,66 and 
the fact that it has proven inefficient. 
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During the Ottoman occupation, Kuwait was part of the province of Basra, 
hence the reason many Iraqis (including the late Saddam Hussein) consider Kuwait a part 
of Iraq. Thus, ever since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has relied on stronger, foreign 
powers to provide its security; first the United Kingdom and then the United States.67 
Kuwait acts as the main logistical base for the activities of the United 
States government in Iraq. As for its own defense, Kuwait relies almost entirely on 
United States protection. The United States declared Kuwait a major non-NATO ally on 
April 2, 2004.68 
Kuwait’s key military forces, as defined by the operational doctrine from 
the Defense Review Group (which was drawn up before the 1994 Gulf War), is to delay 
incursion for 48-72 hours until international reinforcement arrives to its aide. Kuwait 
spends a relatively high percentage of its GDP on defense. Between 2001 and 2004, 
Kuwait spent $2.3 billion on arms deliveries, with the United States as its major 
supplier.69 At any given point, Kuwait is home to around 20,000 United States 
personnel.70 
Bahrain, with a total population in 2000 of about 695,000 (of which only 
460,000 are nationals), has a relatively small military force. Bahrain has, since the late 
1980s, spent between 4-5 percent of its GDP on defense, with an estimated $526 million 
(3.5 percent of GDP) spent on defense in 2005. This might seem like a very small 
number, but Bahrain does not rely on its military for its national defense, rather, it relies 
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on de facto security from the United States.71 President Bush declared Bahrain a major 
non-NATO ally.72 The United States is Bahrain’s largest military partner and has been 
the exclusive supplier of arms to Bahrain in over a decade long period, from 1993 to 
2004, with total deliveries equaling $1.4 billion.73 
Oman has proven itself a United States ally. Oman aided the United States 
and Britain in their 2003 Iraqi invasion by providing them with staging bases. Military 
spending, as a proportion of the GDP, would label Oman as the largest military spender 
in the Gulf. From 1990 to 2005, Oman’s military spending, as a percentage of its GDP, 
ranged from 7.3 percent to 13.0 percent. One significant point in Oman’s military 
spending from 2001 to 2004 was that it no longer solely relied on European providers; 
rather, the United States, in that period, became a major weapons supplier to Oman.74 
Qatar is a close ally to the United States with nearly 6,450 United States 
personnel stationed there. The main United States air base and headquarters in the Gulf 
are located in Qatar, as is the equipment of one United States pre-positioned brigade. As 
such, “Qatar is under de facto US protection.”75 Nevertheless, Qatar has large military 
expenditures. “[B]etween 2000-2004, Qatar allocated an average of 32.5 percent of its 
current expenditure to defence and security, the third highest in the Arab world after  
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Oman and Bahrain.”76 However, Qatar does not spend as much in arms imports or new 
arms agreements; Qatari spending in this category has averaged at $50 million in recent 
years.77 
Though the United Arab Emirates’ Sheikh Zayed and other United Arab 
Emirates leaders opposed the Iraq War, they nevertheless provided the United States 
brigade with pre-positioning facilities, as well as assistance to the United States and 
British forces. This, in effect, provides the United Arab Emirates with “some de facto 
protection against hostile Iranian action or any invasion.”78 The U.S.A. is one of the 
largest defense spenders in the Gulf, with a defense budget of $9.74 billion in 2005. The 
United Arab Emirates’ main arms suppliers are European nations, with the United State’s 
share as a supplier increasing in recent years.79 
C. WHY SHOULD THERE BE AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION 
1. Billions of Dollars Worth of Equipment Should Be Utilized 
The United Arab Emirates has been defined by Jane’s International Defense 
Review as having “one of the best-equipped air forces in the Middle East.” Though 
billions are spent on the pilot, aircraft, and its weapons, less emphasis is placed on 
“sustainability and maintaining high sortie rates, and many key maintenance tasks [are] 
left to [foreign] contract personnel.”80 
The GCC air defense system is not fully integrated. “In practice, the GCC has 
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development of well-trained and integrated forces. This make the United Arab Emirates 
Air Force heavily dependant on the United States for any large-scale operation against 
Iran.”81 
On February 25, 2001, Hizam Al-Tawaun (HAT) was commissioned as a joint 
GCC air defense system.  
This system, which is linked to the GCC air defense structure, includes tracking 
capabilities that enable the council countries to track any airplane in their airspace to help 
them synchronize defensive actions. Unfortunately, it lacks the overall netting and 
integration with air and surface-based fire units, and many other capabilities necessary to 
produce true, modern, real-time integration. It is a first step, but it is now more a façade 
than a capability82. 
The United Arab Emirates Navy is in the middle of a procurement program “to 
upgrade itself from a coastal defense force to a blue-water capable one by Gulf 
standards.”83 With the completion of this program, the United Arab Emirates Navy hopes 
that “together with Saudi and Omani capabilities the GCC can deploy quite a sizable 
naval force to the region.”84 Having a naval fleet of such a size raises the issue of 
interoperability with the other GCC navies, as well as integration issues with the air 
force. Such a goal has “serious manpower and support problems.”85 A major issue with 
the individual security structure of the Gulf States military is that they lack the option of 
being interoperable with each other. 
“The formation of a missile defense system is the most obvious way in which the 
GCC can deal collectively with Iran, given Iran’s Shahab-3 intermediate range ballistic 
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missiles that could be deployed against Gulf countries.”86 The creation of such a system 
has been encouraged by the United States, though not much has occurred in this area. 
2. GWOT 
With the September 11 attack on the United States, the global impact of the 
twenty-first century asymmetric terrorist war and its implications became more than 
apparent. The international community came together to address this growing threat. On 
the 28th of September 2001, the UN Security Council passed resolution number 1371 
“urging all states to cooperate together in stopping all terrorist acts against other world 
countries … [the resolution] also urges UN members to cooperate further in the full 
implementation of the international agreements on terror.”87 Such international 
cooperation calls for multilateral agreements and arrangements with the aim of 
preventing and suppressing terrorist acts and taking the appropriate actions against those 
identified as terrorists. 
Therefore, in accordance with Article 6 of Yemen’s Constitution, Yemen is taking 
a proactive initiative in the war on terrorism88 and is working together with the 
international community in the GWOT. On November 2001, Yemen’s President Saleh 
met with President Bush in Washington to provide “an accurate assessment of the 
security situation in Yemen, outlin[ing] the efforts the Yemeni government has 
undertaken to fight terrorism, and [to] clarify the existing cooperation agreements 
between the Yemeni and U.S. security services.”89 
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The Yemeni government’s counterterrorism efforts are in full cooperation and 
coordination with the United States government. The Yemeni government is in full 
pursuit of terrorists and is exhausting what measures it can to capture them. As part of its 
fight against terrorism, the Yemeni government established the Yemeni Special Forces in 
1999 as a special unit aimed at combating terrorism in Yemen. The Yemeni police 
authority law number 15 was ratified by the Prime Minister in 2002. This law gave the 
government the required authority to ‘start hunting’ for terrorist groups and to foil any 
known terrorist threats.90 In 2005, Yemen increased its efforts in internal 
counterterrorism to include “the use of mass arrests, prosecutions that resulted in jail 
time, and additional heavy guards on various buildings and embassies.”91 
Yemeni and United States cooperation was tested and was proven successful on 
November 6 of 2002. Yemeni intelligence had received information as to the 
whereabouts of six members of Al-Qaeda on Yemeni soil. The Yemeni government 
tipped off the United States forces and allowed the United States forces to send their 
Predator Drone into their air space to kill the Al-Qaeda members while they were driving 
in Yemen.92 By utilizing forces in the Arabian Peninsula, the United States would not 
have to exhaust such enormous efforts to fight terrorism, hence sharing the burden with a 
qualified fighting force. 
If Yemen were allowed to become a full member of the GCC, then its 
counterterrorism efforts could be united and work in unison with the other GCC efforts so 
as to work as one unit, rather than many individual units working alone with separate sets 
of security intelligence.93 This would significantly aid the GWOT and improve the 
counterterrorism techniques against Al-Qaeda’s transnational war. 
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IV. RISE OF REGIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST 
THREATS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What is terrorism? Bruce Hoffman, in Inside Terrorism, provides the following 
definition: 
Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological 
effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It 
is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target 
audience” that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire 
country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in 
general…. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists 
seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to 
effect political change on either a local or an international scale.94 
The effects of terrorism are global (as a side-effect of globalization), in which 
anyone is a target – military and civilian. This new wave of terrorism knows no national 
boundaries, where large-scale attacks are perpetrated in different countries – all for the 
same cause.  
Middle Eastern nations view Islamic extremist movements as national threats to 
be reckoned with, as all have suffered terrorist attacks. All nations have had their political 
agendas transformed to establish improved security procedures on how to deal with 
Islamic extremism. 
While militarism and proliferation pose potential threats to the region’s 
development and energy exports, the most active threat of violence now 
comes from this violent extremism. It does not, however, have one source 
or represent one cause. Some movements have arisen in response to state 
terrorism, some movements have arisen in response to regional conflicts 
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in response to the pressures of social change. The end result is a complex 
mix of threats including national movements, regional movements, and 
truly international movements like Al Qaeda.95 
B. AL-QAEDA 
The Al-Qaeda terrorist network was established in the late 1980s by Osama Bin 
Laden. Prior to that, Bin Laden had been a United States ally in the United State’s Cold 
War, in which he fought with the Afghan mujahideen against the occupying forces of the 
Soviet Union. After that war, Bin Laden, a Wahhabi follower, looked for other Islamic 
causes to fight in. Al-Qaeda was formed with the purpose of “restor[ing] or recreat[ing] 
the Islamic Caliphate combining religious, social, economic, and political power in a 
great sweep across the Islamic crescent from Saudi Arabia to Southeast Asia.”96 The 
leaders of Al-Qaeda have made clear their four main goals: 1- rid the Persian Gulf of the 
presence of United States forces, 2- kill many Americans, 3- support the Palestinian 
cause, and 4- start a pan-Islamic revolution.97 
Al-Qaeda’s activities do not target any one nation, but rather it is a global threat. 
Al-Qaeda members consist of a multitude of nationalities; it also serves as an ‘umbrella’ 
organization for many Islamic Sunni extremist groups. Since its formation, Al-Qaeda has 
been involved in scores of terrorist activities aiming to destroy Western interests in the 
Islamic world. 
A subgroup of Al-Qaeda is the Al-Qaeda Organization of the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). Based in Saudi Arabia, the AQAP seeks to take advantage of the open borders 
between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors to spread attacks on the Peninsula. 
In keeping with Al-Qaeda's dismissal of secular governments and 
boundaries as artificial factors that divide the Islamic world, the strategy 
considered the Arabian Peninsula to be a single indivisible area of 
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operations. In essence, the AQAP leadership planned to develop a firm 
base of operations in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, before extending the 
network into neighboring states. The early execution of AQAP's militant 
campaign in May 2003 led to the shattering of the organization in July 
2003.98  
C. MAJOR INCIDENTS 
1. Saudi Arabia 
[T]he primary threat to Saudi stability –– including the reliability of its oil 
infrastructure –– comes from domestic Sunni terrorist groups that 
subscribe to a more purist version of Wahhabi Islam than the Saudi 
government itself does. These groups, which are populist in nature and 
which challenge the authority of government sponsored clerics, question 
the legitimacy and ruling practices of the entire Al Saud family, including 
its positive relations with the West and its overall economic-political 
openings to the outside world.99 
Saudi Arabia experienced two major terrorist attacks before 2001. On the 13th of 
November 1995, a truck filled with explosives was detonated at the National Guard 
Headquarters in Riyadh. This resulted in the death of five United States servicemen and 
two Iranians100 and over sixty people were injured. Four Saudis, admitting to being 
influenced by Osama Bin Laden, were executed one year later for that crime. 
In 1996, another truck full of explosives was detonated in Al Khubar in a United 
States military housing complex killing nineteen Americans and injuring over four-
hundred people of differing nationalities. The Saudi government suspects that Iran 
backed Saudi Shi’ite were behind this attack. Of the nineteen September 11 hijackers, 
fifteen of them were Saudi. The Guantanamo Bay prison holds approximately one  
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hundred Saudi nationals.101 The year 2003 saw a series of suicide bomb attacks on 
residential compounds in Riyadh, killing over fifty-three people with over one hundred 
and fifty-seven injured102. 
Saudi Arabia has had to shift many parts of its military forces to focus on 
counterterrorism missions as it has been experiencing terrorist attacks long before 
September 11; Saudi territory is, after all, viewed by Al-Qaeda as “the core of a new … 
‘Caliphate.’”103 As such, Saudi Arabia has, since May 2003, made the focus of its 
National Guard to be counterterrorism and to support the Ministry of the Interior’s 
security and counterterrorism operations. The Saudi Border Guard has also shifted its 
mission focus from anti-smuggling to defense against terrorism. With these and many 
other efforts in place, Saudi Arabia has, since the end of 2004, been able to prevent many 
Al-Qaeda attacks and has even succeeded in putting Al-Qaeda on the defensive.104 One 
point of concern to the Saudi Border Guard is the tribesmen who travel to and from 
Yemen across the border. 
In February 2006, the Saudi government was able to foil an attempt to destroy the 
Saudi oil complex, Abqaiq, which was attacked by Al-Qaeda militants.105 
2. Yemen 
Yemen has largely unsecured territories and borders, making it a likely platform 
for terrorists. Other issues of Yemeni society that make it prone to terrorism are the high 
population density with the general population suffering from unemployment, resulting in 
over forty percent of Yemenis suffering from extreme poverty.106  
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As a result, Yemen has been home to two major terrorist attacks that killed 
foreigners. The first was a suicide bombing attack on October 12, 2000 in the port of 
Aden against the USS Cole. This attack took the lives of seventeen United States Navy 
personnel and injured thirty-nine others. After a thorough investigation of the incident, it 
was found that this attack held many similarities to the 1998 bombing of the United 
States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.107 The second attack was also a suicide 
bombing, but this time against the French oil tanker the Limburg in 2002 off the port of 
Al Mukalla. In 2004, Al-Qaeda suspects were captured and tried in the Yemeni courts for 
numerous terrorist activities, including the attack on the USS Cole. Two years later, the 
Al-Qaeda suspects were convicted of performing terrorist acts against Western targets as 
well as against Yemeni officials. In 2006, twenty-three of the convicted Al-Qaeda 
members escaped from a Yemeni prison. Later that same year, an attempt to bomb two 
Yemeni oil facilities was thwarted, resulting in the killing of four of the suicide 
bombers.108 
The Yemeni government is cooperating with United States efforts in the war 
against terror. The cooperation between the two countries includes: 1- training the 
Yemeni military force in the field of counterterrorism, 2- establishing capabilities for the 
Yemeni Coast Guard, and 3- providing the equipment and required training for Yemen’s 
Terrorist Interdiction Program.109 
3. Oman 
The Omani sultanate’s national religion is Ibhadism, which is of a moderate 
nature. As such, Al-Qaeda has found it difficult to recruit militants from Oman. There has 
been no indication of any Omani jihadists in Afghanistan or in the Guantanamo Bay 
prison. 
Oman’s major terrorist incident occurred in December of 2004 with the arrest of 
nearly three hundred Omanis from the Ibhadi sect. The arrests were triggered by a road 
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accident that exposed a truck loaded with weapons, explosives, maps of Oman, books on 
military training and other suspicious material. The incident was seen as an attempt to 
disrupt the Muscat cultural and trade festival. Ultimately, it was revealed that only thirty-
one were arrested and the Omani government denies the incident as being of a terrorist 
nature. All accused were tried and all were convicted with prison terms ranging from one 
year to twenty years. On June 9, 2005, Sultan Qaboos pardoned all thirty-one.110 
Oman strengthened its counterterrorism efforts by adding security measures to 
inhibit Al-Qaeda attacks. It has increased harbor security patrols to prevent attacks, such 
as the one on the USS Cole in Yemen, from occurring. It has also implemented security 
measures to prevent terrorism financing.111 
4. UAE 
The United Arab Emirates, a leading economic power in the Middle East, has 
experienced no direct terrorist attacks. The United Arab Emirates has proven itself a close 
ally with the United States. The United Arab Emirates has accepted the United States Air 
Force 380th Air Expeditionary Wing in its Al Dhafra airbase. The United Arab Emirates 
is on a path of rapid modernization and pro-Western policies. The current president of the 
United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, is ruling with a policy of 
“moderate pan-Islamism while also satisfying the security imperative of the post-11 
September 2001 world.”112 Though the United Arab Emirates has gotten a few terrorist 
threats,113 no major terrorist attacks have been conducted on its soil. 
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Though the United Arab Emirates has not experienced any direct terrorist attacks, 
it has been the scene of many terrorist activities leading to terrorist attacks elsewhere. 
More than half of the terrorists responsible for the September 11 hijacking flew to the 
United States from Dubai. 
Non-native terrorists have long used the bustling roguish entrepot of the 
UAE as a logistical and transportation hub. The combination of huge 
Asian migrant worker population remittances (estimated at tens of 
millions of dollars per day), an enormous gold market, and the presence of 
intertwined criminal and financial services elements made the UAE the 
central node in global terrorist financing operations that included cash 
transfers that paid for the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US.114 
It has been found that the senior Al-Qaeda operative, Abdel-Rahim Al-Nashiri, 
responsible for the attacks on the United States embassies in Nairobi and Mombasa in 
1998, the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, and the attack on the Limburg in 
Yemen in 2002 was captured in the United Arab Emirates by the Dubai Security Service 
in 2002. Risk analysts have described the United Arab Emirates “as an easy operating 
environment for terrorists”115 and as such, terrorist attacks inside the United Arab 
Emirates seem unlikely, so as to “avoid the attention of local and Western security 
services.”116 
5. Kuwait 
Kuwait, home to an expatriate American population that exceeds 35,000,117 is a 
close ally to the United States. Nevertheless, there are a handful of Salafi extremists, 
many of whom have fought in foreign wars (including the post-September 11 wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq), that are planning terrorist attacks in Kuwait aimed at Western 
targets. The Kuwaiti parliamentary system has a well-established presence of politicians 
from the Muslim Brotherhood. “Traditionalist elements in Kuwait include large numbers 
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of deeply conservative but entirely peaceful Kuwaiti adherents to Salafi thinking.”118 
There is however, a political struggle between conservatives and modernists. In 2005, 
women in Kuwait were finally granted their full political rights. That same year however, 
a Kuwaiti minister was forced into resignation as a result of his “failure to keep Western 
ways out of Kuwait.”119 
Kuwait has kept its ties with the United States strong and this can be seen in the 
unprecedented Western military presence in the country. Nevertheless, terrorist acts have 
found their way into the country by “unskilled native terrorists”120 who have no 
connection with the wider jihadi network. As such, their work has been described as 
amateur, scattered and isolated.121 Kuwait’s major terrorist incident occurred on October 
8 of 2002 when two Kuwaitis shot one United States Marine and wounded another. Both 
assailants were shot dead on the scene by United States forces. Two other shooting 
incidents occurred within the next three months resulting in the death of a United States 
national and the wounding of two United States servicemen. Both attacks were 
committed by Kuwaitis who fled to Saudi Arabia only to be extradited back to Kuwait to 
be tried and imprisoned.122 Kuwait experienced other shooting incidents, all of which do 
not appear to have been masterminded by Al-Qaeda. Kuwait, nevertheless, established 
many security initiatives to address the growing threat of terrorism in the country. 
At the beginning of 2005, Kuwaiti security forces led many raids on Kuwait 
terrorist cells, one of which was located near the Saudi border. Though the number of 
explosives and artillery found and confiscated by the raids were not that many, they did 
however signify the growing presence of terrorism in the country. Kuwait began a 
disarmament campaign. 
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6. Qatar 
Qatar, one of the southern Gulf States, has witnessed relatively minor terrorist 
attacks, all of which occurred after September 11. The first attack occurred on November 
2, 2001 at the Al Udeid airbase. Christopher Blanchard notes that “al Udeid serves as a 
logistics hub for U.S. operations in Afghanistan as well as a key command and basing 
center for Operation Iraqi Freedom.”123 Two United States contractors who were 
traveling near the base got shot by a Qatari citizen (who was a member of the Qatari 
military). The terrorist was shot and killed at the scene by Qatari security guards. Four 
months later, the Al Udeid airbase was again attacked by another Qatari citizen. The 
attack consisted of the ramming of the base’s main gate. The assailant was killed in the 
attack. Thus far, these attacks have been the work of individuals; that was soon to change. 
Qatar’s first major terrorist attack occurred in the wake of a call by Saleh 
Mohammed Al-Oufi, an Al-Qaeda leader in Saudi Arabia, on the “brothers of Qatar, 
Bahrain, Oman, and the Emirates, and all the lions of the jihad in the countries 
neighboring Iraq” to attack any target they deemed available. On March 19, 2005 (the 
second anniversary of the Iraq war), only a few days after Al-Oufi’s statement, an 
Egyptian expatriate, Omar Ahmad Abdullah Ali, set off a suicide bomb in the Doha 
Players Theatre. One Briton was killed and twelve others were injured.124 
Qatar has had a growing Wahhabi community since the 1970s. Qatar has also 
been known to harbor exiled Islamist terrorists and radical preachers from many nations, 
including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Chechnya. After September 11, Qatar began a huge 
campaign to rid its government of Wahhabi extremists and began strengthening its ties 
with the United States. In April 2003, it accepted the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center 
for the Middle East in its Al Udeid airbase. In 2004, Qatar passed its Combating 
Terrorism Law, “establish[ing] definitions of terrorism and terrorist financing and 
broaden[ing] the government’s power to detect and prevent terrorist threats and to 
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investigate and prosecute terrorists and their supporters.”125 Qatar’s strong force in 
providing security to prevent terrorism proved why the March 2005 attack was on a 
nonresidential target and thus caused fewer casualties.  
7. Bahrain 
The United States Fifth Fleet is headquartered in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The 
Fifth Fleet is the organization responsible for all United States forces in the Middle East 
and it is the only United States base in the Gulf to permit accompanied tours (where 
United States servicemen go on tour with their dependents). Bahrain is also the location 
of a large United States Navy base.126 Bahrain, a mostly Shi’ite population with a Sunni 
ruling family, is considered a liberal kingdom, especially as compared to its neighbor, 
Saudi Arabia. The Bahrain Security and Intelligence Service keep a close watch on 
former jihadists in the kingdom. In July of 2004, the United States issued a travel 
warning to Bahrain. The perceived terrorist threat resulted in the relocation of 420 United 
States military families. In light of the United States warning, the Bahraini Security and 
Intelligence Service arrested six Bahrainis, all of whom were released for lack of 
evidence. The United States continued its pullout from Bahrain while the Bahraini Prime 
Minister insisted that “Bahrain has been and still is an oasis of safety, security and 
stability.” No terrorist plot occurred in Bahrain, only a diplomatic rift between the United 
States and Bahrain.127 
D. SAUDI ARABIA, THE BIG PROBLEM 
Because of Saudi Arabia’s and Yemen’s inability to legally and officially settle 
their border dispute until 2000, the disputed territory had traditionally been controlled by 
tribal sheikhs. The result was that “Yemen traditionally has been a welcome haven for a 
variety of different militant groups, including Palestinian terrorists, weapon smugglers, 
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and mujahideen from Afghanistan.”128 Though the Wahhabi backed Al Sauds were 
unable to expand their rule to include Yemen, Wahhabi teaching entered Yemeni society 
during the 1970s. This era marked the boom of the oil industry in which many job 
seekers began to migrate back and forth between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. 
Another point of tension is the border shared by Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Many 
Saudis are fighting as mujahideens in foreign wars, such as the current war in Iraq. The 
Saudi fear is the fact that “[t]he jihadis engaged in the war in Iraq are returning to Saudi 
Arabia much younger and perhaps more independent than the mujahideen who returned 
from Afghanistan in the 1980s.”129 As a result, Saudi Arabia, since 2004, is spending 
over $1.8 billion to secure its border with Iraq.130 
E. YEMEN’S INTERNAL THREATS 
Yemen’s internal security is threatened by many events, most prevalent of which 
are: 1- terrorism and extremist groups, 2- political unrest, and 3- a weak economy. 
Yemen’s significant internal security threats, if not addressed, could have an impact on 
the region as a whole. 
1.  Terrorism 
The following is a table on the terrorist events that have occurred in Yemen since 
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Table 3.1. Yemeni Terrorist Events131 
 
Date Event Responsible Party 
January 23, 
2001 
A Yemeni plane carrying the US ambassador, Barbora Bodine, 
was hijacked by Sattar. Incident ended without any deaths or 
injuries besides those Sattar inflicted on himself. 
Mohammed Yehia Ali Sattar (a 




A bomb exploded in front of the house of the commander of the 
First Defense Brigade of the Presidential Guard Brig-Gen Staff 
Ahmed Shamlan. This was the first such attack on a high-




A convoy with the Yemeni Trade Minister and Mahwit’s 




In Radaa, a bomb detonated in a gun market causing 32 deaths 
and 50 injured. 




An explosion occurred at the Sheraton Hotel in Sana’a where 





A bomb exploded in a garbage bin near the Presidential Palace. 
There were no casualties. 
6 people were arrested. 
March 3, 
2002 
Two concussion grenades were thrown at the wall of the U.S. 
embassy in Sana’a. This occurred one day after the U.S. Vice 
President, Dick Cheney, visited Yemen. There were no 
casualties. 
Yemeni University student 
October 6, 
2002 
The French oil tanker, the Limburg was attacked by suicide 
bombers on a boat (in a similar style to the attack on the USS 
Cole). One Bulgarian was killed and twelve Frenchmen and 
Bulgarians were injured. The AAIA later claimed their original 
target had been a US Navy vessel. 
Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) 
December 
28, 2002 
A high ranking official of the Yemeni Socialist Party was killed 





A bomb exploded in a court room in Sana’a, injuring the judge 
and three other people. The attack occurred four days after an 
Al-Qaeda militant was sentenced in the same court (but by a 




The governor of Shabwa was ambushed by gunmen resulting in 
his injury and the death of his brother. 
Takfir wal Hijra (a militant group) 
June 18, 
2004 
Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi began a rebellion in Sana’a 




Yemeni security forces came under fine in Ma’rib from armed 
tribesmen. This resulted in the death of two of the soldiers and 




A Japanese funded cement factory in Amran was attacked by 




A police patrol in Nushur was attacked. This resulted in the 
death of four to seven police officers. 
No group officially claimed 
responsibility, though suspicion is 




The Sa’dah Security Commander was attacked in Sa’dah. This 




The secretary general of the Sa’dah local council was shot at by 




A grenade was thrown out of a passing car at the Central 
Customs Authority building in Sana’a. This resulted in the death 
of a civilian. 
N/A 
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Date Event Responsible Party 
June 21, 
2005 
A bomb was detonated near Sana’a University, wounding three 
civilians and causing minor damage to the campus. 




A Yemeni Parliament official’s car was attacked in Sana’a. This 
resulted in the death of the official and the wounding of two 
passengers. 
Abdullah Al- Qawsi, the Deputy 




The Yemeni Minster of Justice, Yehya Mousa, was severely 
beaten and shot in Zumar by masked men. Mousa survived. 
Al-Houthi followers 
 
Based on the terrorist events timeline from the above table, “attacks on foreign 
diplomatic targets and the Yemeni government assets took place almost on a monthly 
basis … before the attacks of ‘911’ ... After 2002, Yemen began seeing major attacks on 
the government every six months, a noticeable decrease. Political unrests in 2004 and the 
downward turn of Yemen’s economy in 2005 have also brought a higher spurt of violent 
attacks in Yemen than had been seen since 2001.”132 If this threat is not addressed 
properly, more attacks are almost bound to occur. Yemen is on a move towards 
addressing and countering such attacks, but the elimination of terrorism needs 
international joint efforts and cooperation. 
2.  Political Unrest 
Yemen has a population that is over 90% Muslim,133 though the Muslim 
population is split between Sunni and Shi’ites. This split reached violent peaks when 
Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, a Shi’ite tribal leader, began a strong internal rebellion 
against the rule of President Saleh for “increased autonomy for his tribe and for his 
region of Yemen.”134 Al-Houthi was against the war in Iraq and opposed the strong ties 
between the Yemeni government and the United States. Al-Houthi and his followers 
almost took over the capital city of Sana’a on June 18, 2004, resulting in hundreds of 
casualties. Al-Houthi was killed in September of 2004 and his father, Badreddin Al-
Houthi, took over as leader of the rebellion. Al-Houthi rebels and Yemeni troops were 
engaged in a gun battle that lasted from March 27 – 28, 2005, that killed over seven 
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hundred civilians.135 A truce was reached between the Yemeni government and the Al-
Houthi rebels. However, the fact that Al-Houthi senior has not been captured makes this a 
continued threat on Yemen’s security. In January 2007, a renewed wave of attacks in 
Saada killed 41 soldiers and injured over 80 others.136 The Yemeni government quickly 
issued a warning for the insurgents to disarm or face a strong retaliation from the army. 
For now they may have reached another ceasefire, but it is feared that the Al-Houthi 
threat is far from over. 
3.  Weak Economy 
Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen suffers from an 
ailing economy. Thirty-six people died in July 2005 as a result of protests that lasted two 
days in response to the doubling of fuel prices. Forty-five percent of the Yemeni 
population is living below the poverty line. Unemployment in Yemen reached a high of 
forty percent.137 “[T]he lack of work and economic opportunities will make the 
population fertile ground to al-Qaeda recruitment campaigns and exploitation.”138 
Yemen’s economical situation may be dire, but with adequate help from the international 
community, this internal threat can be resolved. 
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V. WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE, AND WHY? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the current rise of terrorism, the GCC should find ways to improve the way 
in which it deals with its environment. It needs to look past the Gulf and recognize the 
importance of including Yemen in the GCC. The GCC must recognize that its past efforts 
to maintain security in the region have failed. A main reason for that failure is their 
exclusion of a vital country in the region. Although Yemen is the poorest country in the 
region, it could bring many advantages to the GCC that would benefit them. 
B. YEMEN TO JOIN THE GCC 
Yemen enjoys a unique geopolitical placement in the Middle East. Nevertheless, 
Yemen is the only nation from the Arabian Peninsula that is not a member of the GCC, 
though its admission has been considered for a variety of reasons. A main reason for its 
admission is that of security. Gulf security has been associated with Yemeni security 
since the early days of the GCC. In 1983, the first Secretary General of the GCC, 
Abdullah Bishara, made the following statement:  
“ امهم هنأو دحاو بعشو جيلخلا اذهل يعيبط دادتما ًابونجو ًلاامش نميلا نلأ امهلصف نكمي لا نميلا نمأو جيلخلا نمأ
هسفن ضرفيس ريصملا قطنمو ةآرتشملا ةحلصملا قطنمو ةوخلأا قطنم ةياهنلا يف هنإف ةيسايسلا تاداهتجلاا تناآ”  
Which translates as: 
Gulf security and the security of Yemen can not be separated because the 
north and south Yemen are natural extensions of the Gulf and we are one 
people and that whatever the political opinions are, in the end, the logic of 
brotherhood and the logic of common interest will impose themselves.  139  
This statement confirms the first Secretary General’s view of the security of the 
entire Gulf region from a strategic point of view in terms of the relationship between the 
GCC and Yemen; and yet more than two decades later, Yemen is still not a part of the 
GCC. 
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In 2006, Qatar Ambassador Mohammed Ahmed Khaleefah stated that: 
:” جيلخلا لودل نملأا مدخي هنمأ نأو نميلل يجيتارتسلإا دعبلا نأ كردن انلعج نملأا سجاوه و تاريغتملا .” فاضأو
“يبرعلا ةريزجلا ةقطنمل ةيماح نوكت يكل سلجملا لخاد اهدوجو مزلتسا كلذل  ة.”  
Which translates as: 
security changes and fluctuation made us realize that Yemen’s security 
and its strategic placement serves the security of the Gulf countries. 
Therefore, its presence is required inside the Council in order for it to be a 
protector for the Arabic Gulf area.140 
C. WHY? 
1. Interest for the GCC Countries 
a.  Yemen Could Provide Soldiers 
The addition of Yemen into the GCC has the potential of increasing total 
military manpower for the GCC. Table 3.1 confirms that Yemen’s full membership into 
the GCC would also lead to the rise of the total population of the Gulf to nearly 55 
million. Yemen has a total population that is 3.5 times more than the average population 
of the six GCC States. A great percentage of the Yemeni population falls under the age 
group of 18-49, a total of 13.5 percent of the population falls in that category, or 2.8 
million people. Furthermore, the CIA estimates about 237,000 young men were qualified 
for military conscription in the year 2005. This would enlarge and strengthen the military 
resources for the Gulf.141 Yemen’s total military and paramilitary manpower can easily 
exceed a total of 170,000 soldiers, including the reserve. In relation to its size, Yemen, 
with a paramilitary manpower total of 70,000, has the highest paramilitary power in the 
Arabian Peninsula.  
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Nearly all of the six Gulf States have a large proportion of their population 
made up of foreign nationals. Many of the six Gulf States allow these foreign nationals to 
enlist in their armies. Qatar, with a military age manpower total of about 239,000, has 70 
percent of this pool made up of non-Qataris, most of which are non-Arabs.142 Yemen’s 
addition to the GCC would allow for a more Arab concentrated military power. 
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Table 4.1. Military Manpower (2005 – 2006)143 
 




















(Ages 18 – 
49) 
Yemen 20.7 66,700 60,000 1,700 5,000  70,000 237,000 2,800,000 




4.5 50,500 44,000 4,000 2,500  10,000 30,706
146 
653,000 
Oman 2.5 39,700 25,000 4,200 4,100 6,400
147 
4,400 26,391 581,000 
Kuwait 2.7 15,500 – 
16,200 
11,000 2,000 2,500  6,000 – 7,000 18,743 865,000 
Bahrain .695 11,200 8,500 1,200 1,500  10,160 6,000  
Saudi 
Arabia 







34,000  130,000 247,000 6,600,000 
                                                 
143 Data taken from the following: 
-  Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, “The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: 
Yemen,” 3, 7. 
-  Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, “The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Qatar,” 
2, 4, 10-11. 
-  Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, “The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: United 
Arab Emirates,” 2, 7, 25. 
-  Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, “The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: 
Oman,” 10.  
-  Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, “The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: 
Kuwait,” 8, 28. 
-  Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, “The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: 
Bahrain,” 2, 7, 17. 
-  Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, “The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Saudi 
Arabia,”5, 19. 
144 In millions. 
145 70 percent of which are non-Qatari.  
146 Including foreigners. 
147 Royal Guard. 
 51
b.  Border Conflicts Put to Rest 
Yemen shares its borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman. Yemen has had 
many border clashes with both Saudi Arabia and Oman in the past, which resulted in 
Saudi Arabia gaining rights over a large portion of the northern part of Yemen. Yemen 
has resolved its border disputes with its neighbors. The last border treaty was signed in 
2002 between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  
Nonetheless, clashes between Yemeni tribes and Saudi security forces do 
happen on occasion. This is a result of the unsecured borders between the countries. 
There is a total of 1,458 kilometers of land connecting Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen 
might have a large military manpower, but that manpower is “grossly inadequate to deal 
with the country’s miles of coastline and undefined desert borders in the north.”148 It is 
believed that terrorist networks (mainly Al-Qaeda) have benefited from this border 
ineptness to their interest of smuggling weapons and explosives between the two 
countries. The Yemeni army’s main border concern is to protect Yemen from potential 
threats coming in from Saudi Arabia and Oman. For that reason, Saudi Arabia, in 2004, 
began the construction of a security border and is now considering a much bigger and 
sophisticated border control system estimated at $5 billion dollars. 
All the countries of the Arabian Peninsula should unite their border efforts 
to make it more difficult for terrorists to mobilize in the peninsula, as well as implement a 
scrupulous electronic identification system. This system would provide its members with 
common access to data in order to positively ID travelers at the borders. In this way, the 
problem of illegal immigrants that Saudi Arabia complains about could be eliminated. At 
the same time, this method would create a great hindrance for terrorist who move around 
in the area. 
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c.  Joint Military Training and Cooperation 
The Yemeni government has taken serious steps towards finding a 
solution to its border problem. In 2005, Yemen signed a security pact with the United 
Arab Emirates to conduct joint military exercises with Saudi Arabia.149 The aim of the 
security pact was to improve and strengthen the efforts between the two countries in their 
war against Al-Qaeda. Symbolically, the pact helped improve the relations between the 
two countries. The pact also emphasizes the Gulf States’ realization that securing 
Yemen’s borders against arms smuggling and terrorists benefits the security of the Gulf 
as a whole. 
Joint military training and cooperation is important to all countries in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Yemen possesses a moderate air force and a weak navy. However, it 
has a significant army with good infantry. Yemen’s military is an experienced one with 
involvement in a series of civil wars, internal heat and border clashes. This experience 
and Yemen’s large military manpower can balance the other Gulf States’ expensive 
military equipment that lacks the personnel to operate them. 
A fault in the way in which the countries manage common threats in the 
area is their inability to cooperate with each other. Joint military training should be 
conducted excessively in the following fields: communication, counterterrorism 
operation simulations in different terrains, border monitoring and cooperating, military 
exchange programs to allow more familiarization with each country’s system, and a 
broader program to include training with international forces. To fight a successful war 
against international terrorism requires that each country’s forces be able to cooperate 
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2. It Is in Yemen’s Interest to Maintain Security in the Arabian 
Peninsula 
a.  Millions of Yemeni Workers Working in GCC 
Yemen’s major export is its labor force, in which millions of Yemenis 
work abroad, mainly in the other Gulf States. This arrangement helps Yemen’s ailing 
economy, as a significant portion of the incomes made by Yemenis living abroad is sent 
back to be invested in Yemen.  
Yemenis hold positions as trusted advisers in most of the gulf countries -- 
including their traditional enemy Saudi Arabia -- and make up the bulk of 
the military and police forces in countries such as the UAE, which has an 
expatriate population that outnumbers nationals by 3:1. Yemenis are 
preferred by these countries as security personnel because they are Arab 
Muslims, are intelligent and hard working, and because most want to 
return to Yemen when their employment is finished.150 
With Yemen’s large expatriate force and poor economy, there needs to be 
cooperation between Yemen and the Gulf States so as to avoid another crisis similar to 
what happened in 1991.151 
One of Yemen’s biggest security issues is how to deal with the 
mujahideen who return from foreign wars. Many Yemenis fought in Afghanistan where 
they were trained in Saudi Arabian and Pakistani camps and supplied with equipment 
from the Central Intelligence Agency worth an estimated $56 billion.152 When the war in 
Afghanistan ended, those ‘battle-hardened young men’ could not find jobs in Yemen’s 
hard hit economy and so joined the army; in the army they could get an income (albeit 
low), food, housing, and a uniform. The influx of these mujahideen into the Yemeni 
army, coupled with the expatriate Yemeni work force from the Gulf States forced back  
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into Yemen, contributed to Yemen’s 1994 civil war.153 Bin Laden reached out to these 
young men setting up small businesses in Yemen, resulting in a third of Bin Laden’s 
recruits being Yemeni.154 
This directly implies that Yemen’s internal instability is linked to an 
increase in terrorism. Yemen, with its instability and low economy, could become a sort 
of haven for terrorists. Terrorist networks have been known to take advantage of poverty 
stricken populations to recruit and train them.155 Though the terrorist threat might at first 
be internal to Yemen, it can easily become an epidemic and spread to the other countries 
in the Peninsula, since the exchange at the borders is feasible.  
Therefore, more needs to be done to ensure Yemen’s stability. In order to 
ensure regional security, economic aide to Yemen is necessary to ensure that its economy 
can provide for its people. Yemen’s economic situation could be the cause of major 
instability in the region if it deteriorates.  
With a little over 20 million people in its population, Yemen faces an 
increase in poverty, as 45 percent of the total population is poor. Yemen has a 35 percent 
unemployment rate. It should be noted here that Yemen is labeled as being a potential 
demographic time bomb. Yemen has a high birth rate of 3.45 percent and 46 percent of 
its population is between the ages of zero and fourteen years. It is only a matter of time 
before these young people will be looking for work. If no work is found, Yemen will 
once again find itself with a large group of restless young people, which is bound to 
ferment instability in the country.  
With a young population and a high percentage of unemployment, danger 
is inevitable. Many Yemenis have no choice but to become illegal immigrants as they 
enter Gulf countries to provide for their families. This exacerbates the problem because 
more poor people are immigrating into the GCC countries. 
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Yemen, being an emerging democracy, is a cause of discontent among the 
six Gulf States. It is ostracized by its rich neighbors for political purposes. Economic 
plummeting could result in a failing state and thereby raise the possibility of it turning 
into a terror playground. It is of global interest to maintain a functioning economy in 
Yemen. Therefore, increasing economic assistance is a major step towards security in the 
region. 
b.  Economic Benefits 
Integration of Yemen into the GCC would provide ample gains both to 
Yemen and to the Gulf region as a whole. “[R]egional integration would enhance 
competition and produce large economic benefits for both Yemen and the GCC 
countries.”156 Forty-five percent of the world’s entire oil reserves are found in the six 
current members of the GCC, with Saudi Arabia controlling over 25 percent of the total. 
Yemen produces a little less than 500,000 barrels per day of oil, which is approximately 
70 percent of its source of income. Yemen, being the poorest country in the Arabian 
Peninsula, would still have a positive impact on the entire region if it were allowed to 
become a full member of the GCC. “Further progress towards efficient integration and 
the eventual creation of a monetary union will likely strengthen the environment for non-
oil economic activities and create employment opportunities for a rapidly growing 
national labor force – two important challenges facing GCC countries and Yemen.”157 In 
a case study done by the International Monetary Fund to simulate the economic events 
Yemen’s integration would cause, it was found that the integration could lead to 
increased competition in Yemen, thereby generating an 18 percent long-run increase in 
GDP. A GDP increase in the long run would also be realized by the other GCC countries, 
estimated at about 20 percent.158 
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c.  United Forces to Counter Threats from Within and Abroad 
Dr. AbuBakr Algirbee, Yemen’s Foreign Minister, remarks that since the 
Cole incident, Yemeni Security Officials were able to strengthen logistical resources 
through the dispersal of security measures and prevent many terrorist attacks, as well as 
arrest a group of people that are part of Al-Qaeda.159 If combating terrorism is a top 
priority of the GCC, it is also a top priority globally. As such, it is a point that proves the 
importance of Yemen’s full membership in the GCC. 
Yemen has adopted the Mercy policy in regards to combating terrorism. A 
report from the Middle Eastern Research Institute indicates that since President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh announced his Mercy policy, 50 people have turned themselves in to the 
authorities.160 Yemen’s role in fighting terrorism is two-fold: Yemen fights terrorist 
attacks and aims to prevent future attacks by directing some of its resources to fight the 
reasons that cause terrorism. Yemen has coordinated a committee of scholars with the 
aim of talking to the youth, to find out what the reasons are that would lead them to join 
any terrorist activities and then to work on remedying those problems.161 
With the fall of the Iraqi Sunni Ba’athist party and the subsequent rise of 
the Shi’ites in Iraq, all other nations in the Arabian Peninsula now fear a rebel uprising 
from their Shi’ite minorities. Coupled with this is Iran’s, a strong Shi’ite country, recent 
endeavor for nuclear capabilities. In order to face this possible threat, Yemen should be 
allowed to join the GCC so as to fight off a common external enemy together. 
The Arabian Peninsula is experiencing extreme religious sectarian 
problems as well. Many fear the failure of all military and security strategies globally and 
locally in returning security and balance in Iraq. The possibility of the fearful terrorist 
cancer being spread into the rest of the countries in the surrounding areas is what makes it 
vital for Yemen and the GCC to tighten their relationship. 
                                                 




Yemen, suffering from “political instability, poverty, large population, 
insecure borders, and constant illegal Yemeni emigration into Saudi Arabia means that 
Saudi Arabia can not ignore the rise of some Yemeni internal conflict affecting Saudi 
Arabia or that a new Yemeni regime might pose a future threat.”162 All countries on the 
Arabian Peninsula are in a war against terrorism, asymmetric warfare, the spillover effect 
of the current Iraqi insurgency, and Iran’s rise to become a nuclear power. That is why, to 
ensure regional stability in the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf States should incorporate 
Yemen into the GCC, so as to fight similar threats in unison. 
The GCC has stated its intention to combat terrorism. If security is of 
central importance to the GCC agenda, then it is required that the leaders of the GCC 
members conscientiously consider the importance of Yemen’s full membership into the 
GCC. This is true especially after the recent attacks in Saudi Arabia, which is presumably 
the strongest of the GCC states. Yemen political analysts point out that Yemen was able 
to successfully maintain a security policy to fight terrorism. Analysts point out that since 
the attack on the French ship the Limburg, Yemen has not had any major terrorist attacks, 
except for some attempted terrorist attacks which Yemeni Security Officials and Anti-
Terrorism Forces were able to put to a halt. 
Prolonging the decision to merge Yemen into the GCC will negatively 
affect the ability of the GCC, as single states or as a whole, from facing the hard events 
that will affect the area and its identity. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is important for the GCC to attain the many benefits that will transpire with 
Yemen’s full entry into the GCC. These benefits are important for the GCC, in order to 
develop and expand. Therefore, the decision should not be prolonged any longer. What 
affects Yemen affects the region, and vice versa. The obstacles in the way of Yemen’s 
entrance have existed since the formation of the GCC. The first Secretary General of the 
GCC, Abdullah Bishara, had the foresight to understand that Yemen’s entry into the GCC 
was only natural; that Yemen is an extension of the Gulf region, and shares its ideas. 
Therefore, it would only seem logical to deduce that Yemen shares the same security 
interests. Yemen and the Gulf region share almost everything, except that Yemen does 
not overlook the Gulf.  
As a part of their nomadic heritage, the Arab states did not define borders to mark 
their territories. It was only with the advent of oil concessions that border delimitation 
began. This created border issues among the Arab countries in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Yemen and members of the GCC have border conflicts. The border disputes between the 
Arab states brought about political bitterness, lack of cooperation, instability and 
vulnerability to terrorism.  
The border dispute between Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. illustrates the political 
bitterness that ensued. Although Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan signed an agreement in 1974 
with Saudi Arabia, his son, Sheikh Khalifa believes that the signing of the agreement was 
only due to duress on the part of the U.A.E. in order to attain global recognition. As such, 
Sheikh Khalifa believes that parts of the 1974 agreement are inapplicable. He has sought 
to begin rectification of that matter through the drawing of a new map of the U.A.E., 
which includes land already ceded to Saudi Arabia. If Sheikh Khalifa is able to gain back 
the territory lost in the 1974 agreement, he would acquire the $10 billion dollar annual 
revenue from the oil in the Shaybah oil fields. Such a great amount of profit would render 
the territory in dispute to be held extremely valuable by Saudi Arabia. 
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Although the agreements that were signed between the countries define each 
country’s border, the borders themselves are not properly secured. This lack of security is 
embodied in the lack of personnel watching the border lines. As such, people are easily 
able to pass through country to country, especially now that the two countries just 
concluded an agreement to allow their citizens to cross the border with their IDs, and 
thus, there is no need for passports. This rendered these countries more susceptible to 
terrorist attacks. The border disputes also brought about the existence of terrorist 
networks between countries. The border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is the site of 
many activities among terrorist groups, including weapons smugglers.  
The border line between Saudi Arabia and Iraq is also a point of scrutiny since 
there are Saudi Arabians who want to perform jihad in Iraq. Those Saudis who return to 
their country after their jihad are unlike those who returned from jihad in Afghanistan, in 
that they are younger and more independent, thus are more likely to become a point of 
concern should they begin to harbor terrorist views. They would become more 
susceptible to recruitment by terrorists. And with the weak border patrolling between 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia, this problem could easily infiltrate Yemeni society.  
Terrorism has been globally scrutinized since there is no immunity to it. Since 
radical extremists threaten the security of the Middle East, the Arab countries in the 
Arabian Peninsula have individually integrated security procedures to counter terrorism. 
Of the major terrorist threats today, one of the biggest is the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. 
Osama Bin Laden founded the Al-Qaeda terrorist network after the Cold War. The 
terrorist network began looking for Islamic causes to fight for. Unfortunately, the Arabian 
Peninsula is an ideal spot for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda to carry out their terrorist 
acts, due to easy mobility and access to weapons. The main goal of Islamic extremists, 
including Al-Qaeda, is to rid the Arabian Peninsula of the American presence. This of 
course presents a great security predicament for the Arabian Peninsula. The lack of 
border personnel between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors allows terrorist groups such as 
AQAP to spread its attacks. The fact that this occurs should be an eye opener for the 
GCC in terms of allowing Yemen to receive full membership. This border issue would be 
resolved through joint cooperation when Yemen enters the GCC. 
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The GCC has not been able to solely depend upon its own security measures for 
protection. Although the GCC was founded after the Iran-Iraq war in order to secure 
common interests as well as to provide protection, the GCC was still inept as was evident 
in the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Iran-Iraq War began in 1980, and resulted in 
the Arab countries all attempting to strengthen their military. Unfortunately for the GCC, 
this was clearly not enough. The Arab countries could provide neither security nor 
protection without the aid of foreign forces, especially the United States. The 
worthlessness of the GCC, as it was, was seemingly apparent.  
Again, after this war, the GCC states spent billions of dollars on weapons. They 
all separately went on their own weapons shopping sprees. Yet, again in 2003, the United 
States War in Iraq was undertaken without the military aid of the GCC. Although the 
GCC has spent billions of dollars to strengthen their militaries, this was not enough. 
There is still a dire need for weapons training as well as integration of the security 
systems among the GCC states themselves. This predicament still presents itself when the 
GCC states themselves commence to combat terrorism. 
Yemen, on the other hand, although it has witnessed major acts of terrorism once 
before 9/11 and once after, has been able to effectively and rigidly combat terrorism. 
Yemen has fully cooperated with the United States, as was evident in 2002 when the 
Yemeni government tipped off to the United States the names of six members of Al-
Qaeda.  
Yemen’s stability affects the stability of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, if the GCC 
granted full membership to Yemen, Yemen would give full cooperation and help in 
maintaining stability in the region. Yemen’s stability is threatened by three major events: 
terrorism, political unrest, and a weak economy. Since the border between Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia is not fully protected and there are those within Yemen who are influenced 
by Al-Qaeda, it is important for the GCC states to provide stability. The importance of 
Yemen’s stability is to prevent the aftermath of instability.  
Another great advantage that would strongly affect Yemen’s stability (through its 
full membership into the GCC) is that it would greatly benefit from economic aid that is 
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granted to GCC members. Yemen’s economy is a direct threat to stability; therefore, any 
investment from the GCC would greatly improve the stability status. Since there is a 
direct link between economic instability and an increase in terrorist attacks, economic 
instability needs to be rectified. This issue is not only a concern for Yemen, but it should 
be a major concern for neighboring countries which are members of the GCC, since 
Yemen’s security will affect the security of the region. 
If economic instability were to ensue, then the people would be easily influenced 
by terrorist ideas and campaigns. Thus terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, would find 
Yemen to be a place that houses susceptible targets for recruitment. These targets would 
then not only be able to perform terrorist attacks within Yemen, but would also be able to 
wander undetected, in some cases, to the neighboring countries. Thus, ensuring stability 
would close the door for Al-Qaeda, stopping it from finding opportunities to spread its 
campaign and find recruits. This accomplished, terrorist attack in the region would 
decrease.  
Yemen’s full membership into the GCC would allow its members to unite so that 
they can finalize and put to rest any border disputes. This could be regarded as a serious 
measure towards the improvement of relations between the countries, especially the 
military relations. The members would also be able to jointly secure the borders and 
therefore thwart terrorist attempts that take place as a result of the ease of undetected 
access from one country to another. The unification of all the states in the Arabian 
Peninsula would allow greater ease in monitoring travelers from one country to the next. 
This would allow for a system of identification and common access to data throughout 
the countries. Such a system is an ideal one for eliminating illegal immigration, as well as 
tracking travelers. By tracking people’s movements, those who plan to perform terrorist 
attacks would be reluctant to continue with their plans. Hence, the system would thwart 
terrorist attacks. 
The GCC relies on foreign aid for many reasons. One of these reasons is lack of 
manpower in the military. Recruitment is not mandatory in many GCC countries, and can 
be avoided. Therefore, the overall size of the GCC’s military is relatively small. In the  
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United States War in Iraq in 2003, the GCC sent 10,000 soldiers and two warships to help 
defend Kuwait. This amount is utterly low. The GCC would benefit from Yemen’s 
military in many ways.  
Since Yemen has the largest paramilitary in the Arabian Peninsula, the GCC 
would be greatly enhanced. Yemen not only has a large population, but 13.5 percent of 
that population fit into the military pool of 18-49. This amount could not only enhance, 
but also strengthen the GCC’s military power. Yemen’s army (as well as Oman’s) is 
entirely made up of Arab citizens, which is in contrast with the other members of the 
GCC. In the rest of the Gulf countries, they partly rely on Foreign Service nationals from 
other countries. 
Although Yemen has a moderate air force and a weak navy, it has a significant 
army with good infantry. Yemen’s military possesses experience, considering it has been 
involved in many civil wars, as well as border conflicts. The GCC could use this 
experience, together with the size of the Yemeni army, to strengthen the GCC’s military. 
Yemen has also participated in military exercises with Saudi Arabia as a part of a security 
pact with the United Arab Emirates, in order to strengthen their efforts in the war against 
terrorism, specifically Al-Qaeda, as well as strengthen their ties. 
One of the main threats towards GCC security is the lack of cooperation and 
integration between the members. Yemen demonstrated its ability to cooperate in 2002 
when Yemen tipped off the United States of the whereabouts of six Al-Qaeda members 
inside Yemen. By doing this, Yemen was able to present its cooperation and thus share 
the burden in the war against terrorism, as opposed to letting the United States fight it on 
its own. Through this act, Yemen has demonstrated its ability to cooperate in the GWOT. 
It is as important to combat terrorism as it is to cooperate during this war. Therefore, 
Yemen would prove to be a great aid in leading the GCC into a more cooperative 
mindset. This cooperation would greatly aid the GWOT. There could be greater benefits 
in reaching the goal of the GWOT if the GCC could learn to cooperate with the aid of 
Yemen. 
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Yemen’s policy towards the war against terrorism has been proven successful. 
Yemen’s adoption of the Amnesty policy resulted in 50 people turning themselves in to 
the authorities. Although fighting immediate terrorism is important to the Yemeni anti-
terrorism policy, the policy also attempts to understand the reasons that would lead a 
person to enlist in a terrorist group. As a result, a committee of scholars was coordinated 
with the aim of finding answers to the question, as well as finding solutions in order to 
prevent future recruiting from terrorist groups. This strategic approach is one of a long-
term effect. By concentrating on the here and now, as well as the tomorrow and future of 
its people, Yemen aims at eliminating terrorism and destroying it from its roots, not just 
combating it. 
Another important benefit arises from Yemen’s entry into the GCC at this point. 
The GCC members have spent billions of dollars on military upgrades and weapons 
supplies. Yet they lack coordination and integration of their systems. The members of the 
GCC are beginning to integrate their systems, including naval and air forces. Therefore, 
such an endeavor is costly, and allowing Yemen to join the GCC during this time period 
would allow it the ability to integrate its systems with the GCC systems at the same time 
they are all integrating their systems.  
Through Yemen’s integration and a joint army, the region would be able to 
gradually rely on itself without foreign aid. The military would be a larger one and it 
would greatly benefit from the ongoing integration of the GCC militaries. The members 
would be able to learn to cooperate, and thus be able to come together and prepare a plan 
for implementation in the region. This plan would accomplish what each country is 
separately trying to accomplish, but through a group effort and cooperation there could be 
greater results. It would put a stop to terrorism. 
The current instability in the Arabian Peninsula is a result of the current terrorism, 
asymmetric warfare, the spillover effect of the current Iraqi insurgency, and Iran’s rise to 
become a nuclear power. Yemen is a part of the Arabian Peninsula; therefore, the GCC 
does not have to face the instability alone. On the other hand, it should unite with Yemen 
and cooperate in order to formulate a plan and execute it jointly.  
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The security of Yemen is a part of the security of the Gulf countries. This was 
duly noted by not only the first Secretary General of the GCC almost 24 years ago, but 
also by the Qatar Ambassador to Egypt, Mohammed bin Hamed Al-Khalifah. For this 
fact to be perceived 24 years ago and to be left unattended to until now is not in the best 
interest of the GCC. The many benefits that will ensue after Yemen receives full 
membership into the GCC should not be taken lightly. These benefits weigh greatly 
towards not only the stability of the region, but towards the security of the region as well. 
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